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Review Essay 
OF GNARLED PEGS AND ROUND HOLES: 
SUNSTEIN'S CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
The Partial Constitution. By Cass R. Sunstein.t Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. vi, 414. Cloth, 
$35.00; paper, $16.95. 
Robert W. Bennett2 
The Partial Constitution is Cass Sunstein's attempt to pull 
together the elements of a civic republican vision for American 
constitutionalism in the late twentieth century. Civic republican-
ism refers to a set of beliefs about government and its citizens, 
traceable to ancient Rome, and associated especially with the 
anti-federalist position in the debates surrounding ratification of 
the United States Constitution. In its revolutionary American 
form, this republicanism: 
meant ... more than eliminating a king and instituting an elec-
tive system of government; it meant setting forth moral and 
social goals as well. Republics required a particular sort of 
independent, egalitarian, and virtuous people ... who scorned 
luxury and superfluous private expenditure, who possessed 
sufficient property to be free from patronage and dependency 
on others, and who were willing to sacrifice many of their self-
ish interests for the res publica, the good of the whole 
community.3 
In Sunstein's contemporary rendition, two notions move to 
center stage, The first is "the general commitment to delibera-
1. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, The University of Chicago. 
2. Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I received 
helpful comments on a draft of this essay from my colleagues Gary Lawson, Tom Merrill, 
Michael Perry, Daniel Polsby, and Stephen Presser. I am grateful to them, as I am to 
Joseph Miller for able research assistance. 
3. Gordon S. Wood, Republicanism in Leonard W. Levy, ed., Encyclopedia of the 
American Constitution 448, 449 (Supp. I, Macmillan, 1992). 
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tive democracy," which Sunstein says is at the heart of his ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation. The second is "status 
quo neutrality." Sunstein explains that neutrality is essential for 
the rule of law, and hence for constitutional law, but that it is 
impermissible to adopt the status quo as the baseline for judging 
neutrality, so that deviations from it are taken to be non-neutral, 
and hence suspect or infirm. Instead in a deliberative democ-
racy, baselines for judgment must be forged by reason, with no 
favored position whatsoever for the status quo. 
The book has a number of interesting and provocative dis-
cussions. It contains, for instance, a nice argument that law is a 
pervasive influence in the formation of individual preferences, so 
that we cannot simply assume that there is some prelegal set of 
preferences that makes up the raw material with which the law is 
to cope. (166-70) And it collects some interesting material as 
part of its argument that people display a different preference set 
when they are acting as decisionmakers in the public realm than 
in the private. (179) Many of the most interesting parts of the 
book are about baselines-for judging when the state has acted, 
when speech has been regulated, when some activity has been 
penalized and when it has been rewarded. 
Unfortunately, the book lacks definition and coherence. 
Sunstein uses key terms with little precision; in particular, he 
never pins down what it takes to be a legitimating "reason." And 
neither of the book's central organizing themes-status quo neu-
trality and deliberative democracy-seems in the end to tie much 
together. Sunstein uses status quo neutrality to mean a lot of 
different things, and his commitment to his stated disapproval of 
a status quo standard of neutrality is belied by many of his spe-
cific discussions. His discussion of deliberative democracy leaves 
many unanswered questions about how that deliberative democ-
racy would serve its supposed ends. Both the concepts seem to 
be mostly rhetorical devices deployed to unify a series of dispa-
rate positions on constitutional matters. Sunstein has earlier ex-
hibited a passion for systematizing constitutional law beyond the 
comfort level,4 and The Partial Constitution is in that pattern. 
4. In one of his early articles pursuing what he characterized as "civil republican-
ism," for instance, Sunstein found a prohibition of something he called "naked prefer-
ences" to underlie much if not all of constitutional law. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984). I expressed doubt about 
that early attempt at constitutional systematization in Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on 
the Role of Motivation Under the Equal Protection Clause, 19 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1009 (1985). 
The "naked preferences" idea appears in The Panial Constitution as well, but in a rela-
tively subdued role. (25-27). 
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In Parts I and II of this essay I describe and discuss Sun-
stein's notions of status quo neutrality and deliberative democ-
racy. In Part III I sketch an alternative constitutional agenda for 
the contemporary United States, one that might be called "neo-
Madisonian." Sunstein labors hard to enlist the Madison of the 
Federalist papers in the cause of civic republicanism, but the at-
tempt falls flat. In Part III I suggest that a commonly discussed 
series of reforms that Sunstein entirely ignores, while surely 
bringing their own costs, would be a good deal more in the spirit 
of Madison's approach than are those to be found in The Partial 
Constitution. 
I 
Sunstein defines "status quo neutrality" as "taking ... as the 
baseline for decision . . . what various people and groups now 
have: existing distributions of property, income, legal entitle-
ments, wealth, so-called natural assets, and preferences." (3) 
Under this conception of neutrality "[a] departure from the sta-
tus quo signals partisanship; respect for the status quo signals 
neutrality." (3) To Sunstein this is unacceptable. Rather the law 
must be fashioned by bringing reason to bear on all questions of 
entitlement. And the reason must be "public-regarding . . . . 
Government cannot appeal to private interest alone." (17) 
The role that Sunstein assigns to "reason" is seemingly unre-
lenting. "[G]overnment must always have a reason for what it 
does." (17) Even "[t]he status quo ... may be accepted only on 
the basis of the reasons that can be brought forward on its be-
half." (135) These reasons must "independently" justify the sta-
tus quo. (6) This means, of course, that government must have 
reasons, and be prepared to advance them, not only for action it 
takes, but for leaving things as they are. 
Sunstein finds traces of this refusal to defer to the status quo 
in the intellectual climate of our constitutional founding, but he 
thinks it became embedded in our constitutional tradition in the 
New Deal. "[T]he outstanding conceptual break" of the New 
Deal, he tells us, was the appreciation "that ownership rights and 
the status quo were products of government," (57) that common 
law "ownership rights, and everything that accompanied them, 
had been created by the legal system" (51) and could be undone 
by it. 
Sunstein is clear, however, that this New Deal project has 
been realized only partially. He analyzes myriad contemporary 
constitutional problems in terms of the failure to resist the allure 
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of the status quo baseline. Thus, on the guarantee of free speech, 
he says that we cannot simply accept the existing regime of prop-
erty rights in media as non-regulation and hence constitutionally 
unobjectionable. "In a regime of property rights, there is no such 
thing as no regulation of speech .... " (206) Instead "protection 
of property rights [in media] . . . must always be assessed 
pragmatically in terms of its effects on speech." (206) In the 
same vein, he lets his imagination run free in discussing a consti-
tutional taking: "a state might be thought to 'take private prop-
erty' if it ... uses law to disable the unpropertied from obtaining 
things. "s (128) 
In many of his most telling discussions, Sunstein uses the 
concept of the status quo to refer, as in these examples, to enti-
tlements associated with holdings of property at common law. 
The definition quoted earlier, however, is a good deal broader 
("existing distributions of ... preferences [among 'various people 
and groups']"), and Sunstein does make use of the leeway pro-
vided by the broad definition. Thus he criticizes the majority 
opinion in R.A. V. v. St. Pau/6 as grounded in status quo neutrality 
for failure to appreciate that racial hate speech is distinctly stig-
matizing, that it produces a hurt that is not simply like any other. 
(251) And he argues for a reconceptualization of many issues 
specially affecting women in our society by urging a willingness 
to look beyond "the sexual and reproductive status quo" that is 
"sometimes ... a locus of inequality." (260) This includes urging 
that the First Amendment be conceptualized in a way that would 
allow at least some regulation of pornography because of the 
harm that it does to women. His discussion of this last point il-
lustrates how easily he manipulates the concept of "status quo 
neutrality." 
Sunstein contrasts the prevailing approach to regulation of 
pornography with that for obscenity: 
Obscenity law, insofar as it is tied to community standards, is 
. . . deemed neutral . . . . Antipornography legislation is 
5. Sunstein does not advocate this position, but his dismissal of it comes in notice-
ably milder terms than his later rejection of a First Amendment theory turning the protec-
tion of the Amendment on whether the speech in question involves "rational thought." 
He dismisses that theory because it would produce "major anomalies" and "jarring" re-
sults. (238) I make note of this not because I think Sunstein has any sympathy for a 
constitutional right to steal, but because it provides an example, of which ~ will ~ote many 
more, of how variable is the "reason" that seems to suffice for Sunstem. It 1s also an 
example, of which there will also be more, of seeming implicit respect for the status quo. 
For one thing that likely makes a result "anomalous" or "jarring" is that we are unaccus-
tomed to it. 
6. 505 u. s. - (1992). 
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deemed impermissibly partisan because the prohibited class of 
speech is defined by less widely accepted ideas about equality 
between men and women-more precisely, by reference to a 
belief that equality does not always exist even in the private 
realm, that sexual violence by men against women is a greater 
problem than sexual violence by women against men, and that 
the sexual status quo is an ingredient in gender inequality. 
(269) 
399 
Embedded here are factual assertions that three beliefs are 
held at least more widely than the contrary beliefs: a) that equal-
ity between the sexes always exists in the private realm; b) that 
sexual violence by women against men is at least as much a prob-
lem as sexual violence by men against women; and c) that the 
sexual status quo is not an ingredient in gender inequality. Now 
I doubt that many people believe any of these three things, espe-
cially a) and b ).7 I should be amazed if more than a handful of 
adults in the country believe b). More to the point, if these be-
liefs are taken to be part of some "status quo" that is illegiti-
mately being used to define "neutrality," it seems a trivial use of 
the status quo concept, far removed from common law property 
entitlement. If all Sunstein means by "status quo neutrality" is a 
position or belief held by some people (more "widely accepted") 
with whom he is in the process of disagreeing, then it hardly car-
ries the encompassing and portentous significance that he as-
cribes to it when he speaks of the "conceptual break" of the New 
Deal. 
If instead we confine the notion of "status quo neutrality" to 
the concern with common law property, we find that Sunstein's 
bark is more fearsome than his bite. As we have seen, he specu-
lates that the prohibition of theft might be unconstitutional, but 
he is really quite mild in the positions he actively advocates. Be-
ing untethered by common law property entitlement undoubt-
edly leaves him feeling more comfortable in advocating such 
things as rights of access to mass media (221-23) and to privately 
owned shopping centers (208) for those wanting to have their 
say. But both those positions have previously been advocated by 
7. I am not quite sure what c) is supposed to mean, or what it might be thought to 
add to a). At other points in the same discussion, Sunstein refers to "the sexual and 
reproductive status quo" (260) and to the "reproductive status quo." (267). If these vari-
ous phrases are meant to be equivalent, then c) may refer to a belief that the physical, and 
perhaps psychological, burdens on women caused by human reproduction should not be 
seen as handicaps causing any worrisome "inequality." I have no idea how to judge 
whether this idea is more or less widely held. 
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courts and commentators who had not thrown common law 
property notions overboard.s 
Sunstein is actually quite eloquent in a defense of the institu-
tion of private property. Thus in discussing the takings clause, he 
says: 
To remove the clause from its moorings in existing distribu-
tions would ... repudiate a huge amount of long-standing law. 
Judges should hesitate before doing that. [T]he notion that a 
constitutional provision should protect existing holdings of 
property from governmental disruption seems ... fully justi-
fied. That notion protects an important form of stability for 
individuals and for the system at large. It also creates and 
safeguards expectations that in turn help promote economic 
planning, investment, and prosperity. Perhaps most funda-
mentally, it is a way of ensuring a degree of independence 
from the whim of the state, which is a precondition for the 
practice of citizenship. A system in which private property is 
open to freewheeling public readjustment may well subject all 
citizens to open-ended state power. This form of insecurity 
introduces a kind of serfdom that is debilitating to democracy 
itself. (128-29). 
Given this defense, it is hard to know just what to make of 
Sunstein's professed disdain for the "status quo" in property en-
titlement. To be sure, if reason is to govern, and is taken to be 
independent of tradition, habit, precedent, and the like, and is 
further assumed to give unique answers to the questions it ad-
dresses, it shouldn't matter if one takes private property or some 
common pool as the starting point. In either event, the end point 
dictated by reason would presumably be the same. The condi-
tions, as we shall continue to see, are hardly self-evident. In any 
event, Sunstein's defense of property seems to be a defense of 
end points, and if that is so it is unclear what he means when he 
insists that every time the government takes an action that affects 
property, or fails to do so, it must have a justification based on 
"reason." 
In one sense, an answer may be transparent. The book is 
full of proposals in which property interests are compromised to 
8. On the shopping center issue see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd 447 U. S. 74 
(1980); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1137, 1207-08 (1983); Gilbert T. Perlman, Comment, The Public Forum 
from Marsh to Lloyd, 24 Am. U. L. Rev. 159 (1974) (passim). On the media access ques-
tion, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,375 (1969); Roscoe L. Barrow, 
The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 Hastings 
L.J. 659 (1975). 
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some social goal. Many of those proposals are by now govern-
mental commonplaces, like welfare programs, broadcasting ac-
cess rights, limitations on sexual surrogacy arrangements, and 
public access to some privately owned areas for the distribution 
of information. Sunstein's disdain for common law property may 
be part of a felt necessity to provide a capacious theoretical tent 
where common law property and its frequent qualifications in 
our society can dwell comfortably together. 
If that is the motivating sentiment, however, there is no ef-
fective way to know what legitimately goes inside the tent and 
what goes outside. Sunstein's talisman of "reason" certainly pro-
vides none. On free speech and property, for instance, Sunstein 
says the following: 
Some regulatory efforts, superimposed on current regulation 
through current property rules, may promote free speech, 
whereas the property rules may undermine it. Such efforts 
might not be 'abridgements' of freedom of speech; they might 
increase free speech. To know whether this is so, it is neces-
sary to understand their purposes and consequences. Less fre-
quently, the use of property rules to foreclose efforts to speak 
might represent impermissible restrictions on speech. To 
know whether this is so, it is necessary to assess the effects of 
such rules in terms of their consequences for speech. In any 
case both reform efforts and the status quo must be judged by 
their consequences, not by question-begging characterizations 
of 'threats from government.' (207-08) 
The problem is that this discussion, with its emphasis on the 
"consequences" for speech of some proposed regulation, is 
pegged at an entirely different level of generality than is the ear-
lier quoted defense of private property. Are the "consequences" 
to be judged regulatory measure by regulatory measure? At one 
point Sunstein suggests just that: "The legal question frequently 
involves the weight, in the particular case, of the interests in sta-
bility and protection of expectations." (103) (emphasis added) 
But then what is to assure that the totality of the infringements 
on property from all the regulatory measures will not undermine 
the "expectations that in turn help promote economic planning, 
investment, and prosperity"? And what mechanism is there for 
concluding that the accumulation of regulation will leave that 
"degree of independence from the whim of the state, which is a 
precondition for the practice of citizenship"? Conversely, if the 
"consequences" for speech are to be judged on the basis of a 
totality of regulation, the problems of judgments are unending 
and insuperable, as each new proposal is subjected to "reason" to 
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determine if it, in combination with everything already existing, 
promotes enough speech to make it worth the cost in dispiriting 
the sturdy citizen property holder. And if the answer is "no," 
presumably "reason" would have to be applied when each new 
infringement on property is proposed to determine what of all 
that exists then must go. The best one could hope for under 
those circumstances would be constant instability of expectations 
that the protection of property was meant to avoid.9 
It is clear to me that the overwhelming assumption in con-
temporary American culture is that of private property, subject 
to reasonable forms of public regulation, and that no conceptual 
break of the New Deal made much of a dent in that assumption. 
Sunstein's own analyses occasionally help solidify this impres-
sion, just as they belie his assertions to the contrary. For exam-
ples, let us look briefly at Sunstein's discussion of two largely 
unrelated problems: the First Amendment status of regulation of 
the broadcast media, especially to provide public "access" of var-
ious sorts (221-22), and the long-muddled problem in constitu-
tional law of the distinction between "rights" and "privileges," 
and the attempt of government to condition the exercise of the 
one or the other. (298-300) 
Sunstein advocates extensive broadcast regulation, finding 
no insuperable First Amendment obstacle. His rationale initially 
seems grounded in his disdain for status quo neutrality. Recall 
his comment that "there is no such thing as no regulation of 
speech." (206) He examines various maladies of broadcasting 
and advocates experimentation with a variety of regulatory 
measures to address those ills. Throughout the discussion, how-
ever, he remains largely silent about regulation of the print me-
dia. He does say that "mild regulatory efforts should be upheld" 
if the government seeks to "promote quality and diversity in the 
newspapers," (225) but that stands in stark contrast to his vigor-
ous advocacy of broadcast access. Indeed, he feels obliged to 
bolster the case for "mild regulatory efforts" for newspapers by 
noting "the fact that many newspapers operate as de facto mo-
nopolies." (225) 
9. The only other justification that occurred to me for Sunstein's defense of private 
property in the midst of a discourse that casts doubt on it at every turn was that the 
defense might be solely for purposes of interpreting the Takings Clause. His discussion 
does draw explicitly on both the words and the history of the clause. But that would not 
make much sense either, since the defense he gives depends so centrally upon the psy-
chology it generates in property holders. That psychology can hardly be generated with 
separate compartments for separate constitutional provisions. 
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The contrast here in Sunstein's approach reflects longstand-
ing differences in the regulatory climates for the print and broad-
cast media in the United States, with the latter taken to be 
subject to a great deal of regulation, because they are merely "li-
censed" to use the public airwaves.lo If one were applying 
unadorned "reason" to the problem of media regulation without 
regard to the "status quo," the disparity of regulatory climates 
would be an obvious target. Many commentators have found the 
distinction unprincipled, whether they have advocated that the 
broadcast regulatory regime be extended to print media, or that 
the print private property regime be applied to broadcasters.u 
Sunstein's failure to address the anomaly seems explicable only 
on the basis of some respect he accords to the prevailing regula-
tory assumptions, to the status quo. The regulatory regime from 
which, relatively speaking, he keeps his distance-the print me-
dia-is the one characterized by the private property regimen 
that he especially insists must always be open to public revision 
in the light of reason. 
Sunstein's fidelity to existing assumptions as the basis of en-
titlement also comes through in his discussion of the distinction 
between rights and privileges. It has long been assumed that 
government could not encroach on "rights" by imposing condi-
tions on their exercise that would be unconstitutional if imposed 
as outright requirements. Suppose, for instance, that my com-
mon law property right in beachfront real estate gives me exclu-
sive access to the beach extending out from the property. And 
suppose also that the government is constitutionally foreclosed 
from forbidding that I speak publicly in criticism of it. The gov-
ernment is then foreclosed from conditioning my access to the 
beach on my refraining from the public criticism. 
The problem arises when the condition is imposed not on 
exercise of a "right" but on receipt of a "privilege." Thus if the 
government starts a welfare program, it is usually assumed that I 
have no "right" to the welfare, only a "privilege."t2 Now sup-
pose the government seeks to condition my receipt of the welfare 
10. Cable systems complicate the picture somewhat and may even now be creating 
pressure for some larger accommodation, but the complications are not really relevant for 
the present discussion. 
11. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access 241-45 
(Praeger, 1976); William W. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment- Per-
spectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. Rev. 539, 544 (1978); L.A. Powe, Jr., "Or of the [Broad-
cast} Press", 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39 (1976); see also Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A 
New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967). 
12. Sunstein might accord a "right" to welfare. He argues for a "freedom from des-
perate conditions" as an important element in a deliberative democracy. (138) 
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on my silence. Over the years there has been a fair amount said 
in cases and constitutional literature that would seem to allow 
this condition, or any other, on my receipt of a mere 
"privilege. "13 
Sunstein objects to any doctrine that would allow such con-
ditions on receipt of something called a "privilege." His reason is 
that the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" dissolves 
once status quo neutrality is abandoned: 
In a crucial sense, all constitutional cases are unconstitutional 
conditions cases .... There is no fundamental or metaphysical 
difference between the unconstitutional conditions case (wel-
fare benefits will be eliminated for those who criticize the gov-
ernment) and the ordinary constitutional case (people who 
criticize the government must pay a fine). The sharp distinc-
tion between ordinary cases and unconstitutional conditions 
cases depends on status quo neutrality. (293) 
With this analytical framework, Sunstein applies his "reason" to 
the solution of a variety of the problems that the right/privilege 
puzzle suggests. In doing so he draws "on a complex range of 
considerations." (304) Included among them seems to be the 
distinction between "rights" and "privileges," the very distinction 
that abandonment of status quo neutrality was supposed to have 
allowed us to escape. 
Thus in discussing Lyng v. International Union, 14 in which 
the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the food stamp pro-
gram that withheld benefits from strikers, Sunstein offers this 
tentative justification for the decision: 
A plausible argument for this outcome would start with the 
proposition that even if the government cannot forbid strikes 
through criminal punishment, it may limit scarce resources to 
people who are genuinely in need. Perhaps the government 
may legitimately conclude that strikers are not in need in the 
same sense as other unemployed people. (305) 
Perhaps a distinction could be drawn between the use of criminal 
penalties and of mere material inducements, such as welfare ben-
efits, but this passage avoids the interesting question of what 
13. The classic exposition is that of Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of 
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517-18 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman .... The servant 
... takes the employment on the terms which are offered him."). For a modem example 
in the welfare arena, see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,324 (1971) (the plaintiff "has the 
'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid ... flows 
from that refusal."). 
14. 485 u.s. 360 (1988). 
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would happen if the government didn't deny welfare benefits to 
strikers, but rather assessed a "civil fine." The one is no less 
scarce than the other, nor less appropriate because strikers are 
assumed "not in need in the same sense as other unemployed 
people." They would appear to differ only to the hidebound 
among us who think of denying welfare as withholding some-
thing that is a public resource and a civil fine as the confiscation 
of a private resource. 
This should not describe Sunstein. As we have just seen, he 
instructs us that "[t]here is no fundamental or metaphysical dif-
ference between . . . [the case where] welfare benefits will be 
eliminated for those who criticize the government ... and ... 
[where] people who criticize the government must pay a fine 
.... " Despite this, in the end he expresses some continuing af-
finity for "a core and unavoidable insight of current law" in its 
treatment of funding, licensing, and employment cases as accord-
ing greater leeway to the government to deny or withhold. (305) 
It is hard to see what that core insight is other than some close 
kin to the status quo as represented by common law property.ts 
I thus conclude that in the final analysis Sunstein, like the 
rest of us, is under the spell of common law notions of property, 
and probably of other aspects of the status quo. In all likelihood, 
Sunstein's characterization of welfare resources as "scarce" is a 
recognition that they are the government's to dispense in a way 
that the strikers' property is not. Toward the beginning of The 
Partial Constitution Sunstein comments that a status quo measure 
of neutrality is widely held "so much so that it operates reflex-
ively rather than self-consciously." ( 4) This is the reason, he in-
sists, that "it accounts for so many understandings about the 
meaning of the Constitution." ( 4) In the end, I fear that the 
15. In principle I do not have much difficulty in finding that the government cannot 
condition welfare on relinquishment of (at least many) constitutional rights. When the 
government establishes a welfare program, it has defined those benefits as important, and 
it is this fact that forecloses the condition. For this reason the case is quite unlike a claim 
of "right" to welfare benefits, where there is no existing program. The latter claim should 
be rejected on the ground that individuals do not have a claim on public resources akin to 
the claim they have on their own resources. To be sure, once a welfare program is estab-
lished, there will be legitimate conditions on entitlement-need, dependency, age, and 
the like. To make the judgment that some condition is unconstitutional, it will be neces-
sary in part to judge whether that condition is "like" or "unlike" the legitimate conditions. 
The exercise of judgment cannot be avoided, but at least that judgment can take as a 
given the legislature's acceptance of the general obligation. Herein, I think, lies some of 
the contemporary attraction of the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for substantive 
review of legislation. It focuses attention on a decision the state has already made as the 
starting point for judicial analysis. I discussed this point at greater length in Robert W. 
Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 445, 489-91 (1984). 
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book proves this point fully as much by example as it does by 
argumentation. 
None of this is to deny that there is a real problem of base-
lines in constitutional law, nor that ambivalence about the status 
quo is an important element of that problem. Sunstein has gen-
eralized the point, but recognition of the baseline problem is 
longstanding. Any number of scholars have urged, in particular, 
that a state action requirement fatally suffers from a baseline 
problem. They note that the state through its laws requires, for-
bids, or tolerates everything, and hence that "state action" is al-
ways present unless perchance there is some comfortable 
measure of the necessary state involvement.16 Any such baseline 
has proved elusive, leading many of those scholars to urge that a 
state action requirement serves no independent purpose. 
What I do mean to deny is that Sunstein has advanced the 
inquiry by insisting on "reason" as somehow substituting for the 
status quo baseline. It is necessary to specify what counts as a 
permissible reason with a lot more clarity than Sunstein has pro-
vided before one will have placed any real restraint on what can 
be done in its name, or, for that matter, to have excluded the 
embrace of accustomed ways of approaching problems embed-
ded in the status quo. 
Almost twenty years ago, Hans Linde cautioned that "[i]t is 
a realistic postulate that laws do not get enacted for no reason at 
all .... "17 Linde elaborated as follows: 
a policy often results from the accommodation of competing 
and mutually inconsistent values, or because it simply intends 
to favor one interest at the expense of another, or because it 
represents only a judgment of the justice or equities in the im-
mediate issue without intending to accomplish any further 
aim.ls 
16. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957); Alexander, The Public/Private Distinc-
tion and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 Const. Comm. 361 (1993). I expected 
to find Sunstein embracing this position. Since he asserts that the "status quo" is entitled 
to no presumption in its favor, it would seem to follow that state tolerance of what is, is all 
the "action" that is required. For that reason I was puzzled to find him insisting that a 
state "actor" must be actively involved. In the end, there is little difference between the 
implications of Sunstein's approach and that of the state action skeptics, since Sunstein 
insists that the state actor can be a judge, or other enforcement official, so that he would 
find the necessary state involvement whenever there is any attempt to enforce private 
prerogatives through public processes. 
17. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 212 (1976). 
18. Id. 
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For Sunstein the problematic category is where legislation favors 
"one interest at the expense of another," but Sunstein's error is 
in (sometimes) seeming to assume that this can never supply a 
"reason." Quintessential New Deal programs like social security, 
farm support, and child labor laws are described comfortably in 
such terms. This is not to say that one must approve or disap-
prove all such favoritism, but only that the difference lies in the 
realm of values, and not of "reason" in any other sense. 
I would also deny that the status quo is unattractive as a 
presumptive baseline. Reasons come in lots of shapes and sizes, 
and it is not at all obvious why respect for the status quo should 
not qualify as one. The status quo has lots to be said for it, much 
of which Sunstein has said. 
His defense of property captures part of it. I'll paraphrase: 
To deny the status quo presumptive respect "would ... [risk re-
pudiating] a huge amount [of what we take for granted, and 
which provides] .... an important form of stability for individu-
als and for the system at large." Respect for the status quo "cre-
ates and safeguards expectations" that foster secure and tranquil 
lives, as well as "planning" and "investment." And it ensures pri-
vately defined reference points, giving "a degree of indepen-
dence from the whim of the state."t9 
But there is more. Respect for the status quo also makes 
possible reform that is constructive rather than destructive. 
There is a Burkean strain in American political thought that 
views the status quo as embodying the accumulated wisdom of 
the ages.2o Sunstein notes and rejects this view (or, perhaps 
more precisely, dismisses it as a half truth, and then ignores the 
non-dismissed half) (130-31), but Burke's insight is real, and 
there is no reason why it cannot be accepted in degrees. If ex-
isting practices were too repugnant, they would not have lasted, 
at least in a society that holds open avenues for change. What 
has survived thus comes with some assurance that its costs have 
19. Sunstein also generalizes the point in an interesting discussion of what he calls 
"endowment effects," (166-73) the creation of expectations by existing distributions and 
entitlement. He acknowledges that "the psychological effects of existing endowments" 
supports a "partial defense" of "status quo neutrality," (171) but that point then goes the 
way of so many others in his insistence that unrelenting reason can accord no preference 
to the status quo. 
20. See Burke, Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons, in 
James Burke ed., The Speeches of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 405, 408 (1865) 
("Speeches"). Hayek made the point even more explicitly. See F.A. Hayek, The Errors 
of Constructivism, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of 
Ideas 3, 10 (U. of Chicago Press, 1978) ("Errors"). Incidentally, each insisted that he 
nonetheless welcomed reforms. See Burke, Speech on Economical Reform, in Speeches, 
at 170; Hayek, Errors at 18-19. 
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been tolerable. That might well suffice to allow the status quo to 
form the presumptive base from which a society can then reason 
about what to change. 
Consider, for instance, the rule that custody of a child re-
sides with its natural parents, absent renunciation, abuse or some 
severe inability to bear the responsibility.21 In all likelihood, this 
rule responds to extraordinarily powerful human emotions. 
These are evidenced by contemporary social movements and 
laws that would often accede to parental prerogatives, even in 
the face of substantial evidence of unfitness, or of strong indica-
tions that the well-being of the child would be better served by 
different custody arrangements. If we undertook a lot of re-
search, we might accumulate data that would justify the usual 
rule by some utilitarian or other calculus of the interests of chil-
dren and parents, and of social cohesion. But it seems quite un-
likely that we now have anything approaching data to support 
such a conclusion. Should that mean that we welcome the appli-
cation of unadorned Sunsteinian "reason" to solve the question 
of where custody of children should normally reside? I doubt 
that Sunstein would think so. He would doubtless urge that "rea-
son" shows change here to be a bad idea. But it will have missed 
the mark unless that "reason" draws on the fact that these ar-
rangements have been accepted in our society for a very long 
time-that they come with the kind of approval that only long-
standing survival can provide. That is respect for the status quo, 
and it is a reason, at least in the loose sense that Sunstein uses 
the term. 
Such respect need not be absolute. If weighty considera-
tions counsel change, respect for the status quo should not stand 
in the way. But without that respect, our reasoning has no 
anchor, no place to return, when, as will so often be the case, 
reason does not muster resolve. Reasoning without that anchor 
in an uncharted sea of reasons would, later or more likely sooner, 
give reform a bad name. 
II 
In a deliberative democracy as Sunstein depicts it, "public 
officials would be accountable to the people, but also in a posi-
21. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United 
States, § 19.6, at 821-22 (West, 2d. ed 1988); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
For a powerful argument that the presumption might appropriately be loosened a bit, see 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1993). 
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tion to avoid interest-group power and thus to deliberate broadly 
about the public interest." (v) In this system, "political outcomes 
... are to be produced by an extended process of deliberation 
and discussion, in which new information and new perspectives 
are brought to bear." (134) The process is to be characterized by 
"widespread participation by the citizenry," (135) but it does not 
consist of summing up voter preferences in some fashion, "pre-
cisely because preferences have [themselves] been created by 
legal rules." (11) 
The participants in this process must have "a large degree of 
security and independence from the state." (136) It is on this 
basis, as we have seen, that the institution of private property 
receives much of its justification. But this does not require invio-
lable private property rights, and indeed a redistributive tax sys-
tem may be required, because in addition to property rights, "the 
assault on dependency implies ... social programs designed to 
ensure that no one is dependent." (136) Thus there must be 
"freedom from desperate conditions," and "rough equality of op-
portunity." (138-39) 
The deliberation is to lead to agreement, but the process is 
not horse trading. Sunstein is at pains to distinguish civic repub-
licanism from interest-group pluralism, where politics is seen as a 
succession of accommodations among interest groups. One of 
Sunstein's objections to interest-group pluralism seems to be its 
detachment from substantive values. "[R)epublicans[, on the 
other hand,) ... believe that there are frequently correct answers 
to political controversy." (137) Apparently this does not, or does 
not necessarily, mean that the answers are substantively better 
than others that might be given, because the "[a)nswers are un-
derstood to be correct through the only possible criterion, that is, 
agreement among equal citizens." (137) (emphasis added) 
There is an awkwardness in this talk of a procedural crite-
rion for determining those "frequently correct answers to polit-
ical controversy," an awkwardness that is reinforced by the 
book's devotion to so many substantive prescriptions for consti-
tutional law. Many of these prescriptions could, I suppose, be 
seen as suggestive only, demonstrations of the kinds of reasoning 
in which a republican political process might engage, without any 
intention to suggest that the resolutions somehow ought to domi-
nate contrary agreements that might be reached "among equal 
citizens." But there is one particular respect in which Sunstein's 
devotion to republican processes is tested, and found half-
hearted. 
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In a sense, the question of the role of democratic politics in 
the United States is the mirror image of the question of the role 
of courts. Sunstein devotes explicit attention to the role of 
courts, understandably since such questions have dominated re-
cent constitutional debates in both the political and scholarly 
realms. Sunstein indicates repeatedly that "[ t ]he role of courts in 
... [the] process will be limited," (140, see also, e.g., 9, 11), be-
cause of a variety of "institutional limitations" under which they 
labor. The most basic of these is that judicial activism is inconsis-
tent with the democracy part of deliberative democracy. 
In Sunstein's telling, however, this leads not only to limits 
but to an important role for the courts. 
[T]he case for an aggressive role for courts is especially strong 
in [only] two classes of cases. The first involves rights that are 
central to the democratic process and whose abridgement is 
therefore unlikely to call up a political remedy .... [Thus] our 
interpretive principles ought to be especially attuned to harm-
ful effects on the system of free expression and on political 
participation and representation. 
* * * 
The second category involves groups or interests that are un-
likely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process . . . 
[because of] pervasive prejudice or hostility .... Courts should 
give close scrutiny to governmental decisions that became pos-
sible only because certain groups face excessive barriers to ex-
ercising political influence. (142-43) 
This "representation reinforcement" rationale for judicial 
revieWZ2 is, by now, standard fare among constitutional theorists. 
For Sunstein's purposes, the first category may be largely (if not 
entirely) unexceptionable, but that is not true of the second, 
where "groups or interests" that have fair and equal access to the 
franchise (and to media of communications) nonetheless "are un-
likely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process." Sun-
stein gives no hint of why as a "civic republican" he should find 
"an aggressive role for courts" congenial in such cases, and the 
answer is far from obvious. 
It is by now well understood that the best available evidence 
on which to base such judgments will usually be the substance of 
the decisions affecting those groups.23 This means, of course, 
22. The best known contemporary exposition of the notion is found in John Hart 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980). 
23. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063, 1f172-77 (1980). I say "usually" because there may be 
occasions when one could uncover evidence of discussions among legislators showing 
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that the courts will judge the fairness of those decisions, obvi-
ously using a standard for review other than "agreement among 
equal citizens," which was supposed to be the only acceptable 
criterion for the correctness of a political decision. The rationale 
for their doing so, I suppose, is that a political decision in such 
circumstances could not have been informed by full and effective 
participation of those treated unfairly. But that observation only 
serves to locate us on a vicious circle, not to solve the problem of 
how to get off it. 
I would have thought that the "civic republican" answer to 
the dilemma was fairly clear, and contrary to Sunstein's. First, it 
is not obvious why unelected courts should be thought to be 
some decent substitute for fairly constituted legislatures if "the 
only possible criterion" of correctness truly is "agreement among 
equal citizens." Imperfectly constituted legislatures seem a 
closer substitute, particularly given the assumption, for which 
Sunstein argues, that individuals even in our present imperfect 
world are able to cast aside personal interests when they enter 
the realm of public decisionmaking. (179-83) Even now repre-
sentative bodies make decisions for nonmembers all the time, not 
only for all the nonlegislator citizens, but for members of unrep-
resented groups-for noncitizens, for children, for prisoners, for 
the disengaged, for all those groups that have not succeeded in 
placing members in the representative assemblies. Neither Sun-
stein nor any other commentator of whom I am aware suggests 
doing away with most of these elements of unrepresentativeness. 
It is unclear why Sunstein might trust legislatures with decisions 
for some or all of those groups but not for the others he seems to 
have in mind. 
Second, and more important, substantive review in this sec-
ond category of cases is on a collision course with Sunstein's gen-
eral insistence on judicial restraint lest the processes of 
deliberative democracy be diminished. For if the best way to 
judge whether a group has been treated fairly in the political pro-
cess is to review the substantive fairness of some action chal-
lenged by that group, then the two tend to become equivalent. 
In the name of assuring a fair legislative hearing, the courts will 
be called upon to review all manner of measures for substantive 
fairness. The prospect should be chilling to a civic republican, 
their conscious disdain for the interests of some group, or some other direct and useable 
evidence of "pervasive prejudice" that does not take the form of unfair legislation or 
other unfair government action. But such instances will be rare. 
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and Sunstein provides no explanation of why he not only toler-
ates but encourages it. 
One suspects that the answer lies in some results that he 
seeks to justify. Whether this is so or not, Sunstein's discussion 
of the constitutional status of abortion provides an instructive ex-
ample of the problematic nature of trying to justify active judicial 
review from civic republican premises. 
Sunstein criticizes the opinion in Roe v. Wade for grounding 
the interest of pregnant women in access to abortion in substan-
tive due process. Instead he urges that the rubric of equal pro-
tection more comfortably accommodates abortion rights. He 
adopts Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument that a prohibition of 
abortion leaves pregnant women required to devote their bodies 
to the sustenance of another in a way that others are not required 
to do.24 (272-74) He suggests the hypothetical case of a father of 
a child who requires a kidney transplant to save its life where the 
father could be the donor without risk to himself. Sunstein sug-
gests, almost surely correctly, that the father would not legally be 
required to donate the organ. The example is thus telling evi-
dence that the prohibition on abortion treats women unequally 
and disadvantageously. 
There are difficulties with the argument, and Sunstein dis-
cusses a good many of them. Of particular note is that men have 
been drafted for service in the armed forces, and especially for 
combat roles, while women have not traditionally been subject to 
the draft. Sunstein notes that this might be thought to be a 
"plausible counterexample." (276) In the end, however, he con-
cludes not only that the example is not suggestive of equal treat-
ment of men and women, but that it actually supports the claim 
of unequal treatment: 
legal requirements that only men be drafted are part of a sys-
tem of sex role stereotyping characterized by a sharp, in part 
legally produced split between the domestic and public 
spheres-with women occupying the domestic and men occu-
pying the public. In this light, legal restrictions on abortion 
and a male-only draft serve similar functions. Restrictions on 
abortion [remain] . . . an element in the legal creation of a 
domestic sphere in which women occupy their traditional role 
.... (276) 
Satisfied that he has dealt with this and other arguments, Sun-
stein concludes that restrictions on abortion can only be under-
24. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47 (1971). 
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stood as a product of a "discriminatory purpose ... ultimately at 
work." (275) 
Sunstein's argument here is a powerful one and it is skillfully 
presented, but it is far from overwhelming. Perhaps the male-
only draft, and the use of men but not women for combat, is part 
of a larger invidious treatment of women, but Sunstein has over-
simplified the argument at several points. Fathers would not be 
required to donate the organ, but neither would mothers. And 
there is ample evidence that the burdens and benefits of service 
in the armed forces have recently been borne and enjoyed by 
members of racial minorities,25 groups that Sunstein and most 
others have viewed as politically disadvantaged. Perhaps there is 
some way to understand the motivation behind the now-defunct 
draft as somehow invidiously to exclude women from a privi-
leged public sphere, while the motive behind the present form of 
the armed services is to project traditionally disadvantaged 
groups into that same public sphere, but I have trouble wrapping 
my mind around such a combination. The male-only draft may 
be a perfectly good example of an institution that could not sur-
vive the application of "reason" to its evaluation, but in context it 
supplies only the most ambiguous of evidence of a "purpose [to 
disadvantage women] ... ultimately at work."26 
Abortion remains an issue on which our society is deeply 
divided, and on which political compromise is stymied. This is so 
for reasons that surely have much to do with the role of women 
in our society in all its complexity, but that also draw on myriad 
religious, moral and political considerations. For an old-fash-
25. See generally, Martin Binkin, et al., Blacks and the Military (Brookings, 1982). 
By 1992, blacks made up six percent of the generals in the army, a number that must 
compare favorably, for instance, with the officer corps of virtually any big business con-
cern in the United States. See Charles Moskos, From Citizens' Army to Social Labora-
tory, Wilson Q., Winter 1993, at 83, 88. 
26. My own view is that abortion rights are best left right in the due process orbit 
where Justice Blackmun situated them. The Equal Protection Clause is most appropri-
ately used to bring into relief a comparison between the treatment of two groups, where 
the treatment of one is taken to be established as legitimate or illegitimate. See note 15 
supra. But, as Sunstein himself notes, "nothing is quite like pregnancy .... If fetuses are 
to survive, it must be a result of impositions on women. Selectivity is foreordained by the 
brute facts of human physiology." (275, 281) In such an environment, comparison with 
some different treatment of men is bound to be unenlightening. 
Other wise voices besides Sunstein's have urged the equal protection route, see, e.g., 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198-1200 
(1992), but I remain doubtful. Besides the conceptual difficulties discussed in the text, an 
equal protection approach may represent a tactical mistake for advocates of abortion 
rights, for it focuses on women as the disadvantaged group just as more women-many of 
whom may not favor abortion rights-are attaining political power. Over time, the polit-
ical disadvantagement prop for the equal protection rationale might just collapse. 
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ioned constitutionalist like myself, the political impenetrability 
provides at least the starting point of an argument that judicial 
review of the question is appropriate.27 But for a civic republi-
can, the very complexity of the issue should make it quintessen-
tially appropriate for political forums where a wealth of "new 
information and new perspectives" can be brought to bear. 
My concern about Sunstein's vision of a deliberative democ-
racy runs deeper than questions about the depth of his devotion 
to it, for in its name he advocates positions that seem oblivious to 
questions of how public policy actually is made. The phrase "de-
liberative democracy" is rife with ambiguity on such questions, 
and Sunstein has done almost nothing to help us cut through the 
ambiguities. 
The beauty of the classical republican vision was that it sug-
gested simultaneous solution of two of mankind's deepest dilem-
mas, how to have virtuous individuals and responsible 
government. The republican citizen exemplified virtue in partici-
pation in governance, precisely because acting in this public ca-
pacity he chose responsibly rather than selfishly. But this 
simultaneous solution of the two problems depended upon their 
interaction, and the modem day has largely separated them. In 
the contemporary United States, save for the act of voting, very 
few individuals do-or could hope to-take active part in gov-
ernance at all, let alone at the national level, where many of the 
most important decisions are made. Sunstein's mechanism is 
thoroughly anachronistic. We live in an age of division of labor, 
and there is simply no way that we can tum either the clock or 
the geography back to a setting where governance can be by 
agreement among equal citizens. 
Of course, Sunstein cannot literally mean that agreement of 
all citizens is necessary, but it is not at all clear what he does 
mean. To make a real stab at tying the strands of republicanism 
around the unwieldy modem day, it seems important to get a 
handle on the connection between citizen input into public deci-
sions and the legislative output. 
Sunstein has a great deal to say about input at the citizen 
level. His emphasis, as I have said, is on citizen ability to contrib-
ute to a political dialogue. It is in pursuit largely of that goal that 
he would mold the First Amendment's protection of speech. 
There are also times when he seems to focus on the legislative 
deliberations, and after all that is where the public policy deci-
27. See Robert W. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, 
Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 978, 992-99 (1981). 
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sions on which the book focuses so much attention are finally 
made. (27) Thus in trying to make out the case that the Framers 
had a deliberative democracy in mind from the outset, he points 
to the fact that the constitutional convention was closed "from 
public view." (22) But Sunstein has almost nothing to say about 
the way in which non-legislator inputs contribute to the outputs. 
His apparent approval of the closing of the constitutional con-
vention is only suggestive of how complex those connections 
might be thought to be. 
Consider Sunstein's advocacy of rights of access to the 
broadcast media. He rehearses contemporary maladies of broad-
casting and concludes that citizen involvement through access 
rights can only enrich the mix. This might well be responsive to 
an individual sense of alienation from the political process, and 
in this sense could give those who gain the access a sense of polit-
ical involvement and hence individual fulfillment.2s But that is a 
very different thing from contributing to a higher quality of pub-
lic decisionmaking. 
There is at least a plausible argument that access rights de-
tract from the dialogue in which public decisions are forged. For 
rights of access likely tend to weaken the media that are required 
to provide those rights. Those media must relinquish space or 
time to satisfy the rights, and this provides them with incentives 
to say and do less that will trigger the access rights. Sunstein, for 
instance, seems to favor reinvigoration of the "fairness doctrine," 
(223) under which broadcasters who carry material on controver-
sial issues of public importance must provide "balance" on those 
issues. The clear incentive is to avoid such programming. And if 
broadcasters overcome those incentives, they lose a degree of 
control over the substance of what gets said. They are thus di-
minished both editorially and economically, and that makes them 
less effective contributors to informed public decisionmaking. 
Whether this is a good or bad thing in terms of contributions 
to eventual legislative deliberations depends, in part at least, on 
whether media in general make more effective contributions to 
those deliberations than do the individuals to whom the reforms 
28. At one point Sunstein considers the possibility that the First Amendment free 
speech guarantee might be aimed at protecting "the development of individual capaci-
ties." He rejects this view in favor of protection of political speech in support of delibera-
tive democracy. The latter, he says, holds "out the best promise for organizing our 
considered judgments about the range of cases likely to raise hard First Amendment 
questions." (239) Entirely unattended is the possibility that the First Amendment might 
be aimed at-and have to be understood as compromising among-a multiplicity of 
values. 
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Sunstein advances would afford access they would not otherwise 
have achieved. Sunstein insists that the "consequences" of one 
approach to speech or another are what really count, but he 
seems not to have in mind consequences like these that should 
really matter if one's concern is with contribution to eventual 
outcomes. 
There is another problem with Sunstein's prescription for 
citizen input, besides questions about their comparative ability to 
make a substantive contribution. It is not obvious that more citi-
zen access to media yields better understanding even of their 
content. More here may not be better. The last decade has seen 
an incredible proliferation of the means, and correspondingly the 
amount, of both public and private communication,z9 but each of 
us has a limited capacity to listen and to absorb. After that com-
munications to us can get in the way of one another. They impart 
more and more noise and less and less information.3o 
While Sunstein notes the proliferation of media, he also 
seems oblivious to these implications. He suggests (though far 
from explicitly} that the republican approach to speech (he calls 
it the "Madisonian ideal" (213)) is to obtain the maximum 
amount of it, and the maximum amount of audience for each ut-
terance (with some unspecified credit thrown in for "diversity"). 
Thus more than once he says that people are "prevented from 
speaking" or are not speaking "freely" if they don't have access 
to places or media where they can increase the size of their audi-
ence. (207, 215) 
The apparent assumption behind Sunstein's positions is that 
all inputs have equal capacity for contributing to outputs, at least 
if appropriately amplified. But it is hard to imagine that he could 
believe any such thing.31 Obviously public opinion influences 
legislative behavior, even between elections. And appearances 
29. This is most obviously true in the case of public and private electronic media, but 
it is also the case, for instance, that the number of magazine titles in the United States has 
nearly doubled over the last decade. See New York limes, Dec. 6, 1993 at C6. 
30. My colleague Gary Lawson points out that this problem may run much deeper. 
In comments on a draft of this review, Gary said: "If the goal of republicanism is to turn 
the country into a gigantic town meeting, with every aspect of public and private life 
(there is, according to Sunstein, no difference) up for grabs in the political marketplace, 
no individual can possibly be informed as to every issue, or even most issues. This is a 
prescription for interest group warfare of the worst kind, as people concentrate on those 
aspects of the political process in which they have a comparative advantage." Gary insists 
that the point is not original with him. 
31. See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 466, 473 (1983) ("[I]t is widely accepted among scholars-though to my 
knowledge it has never been scientifically demonstrated-that not all pages of words are 
of equal intellectual value.") 
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in mass media, including those achieved through any access 
rights, can affect legislative deliberations directly, or indirectly by 
affecting public opinion. But communications vary in their intel-
ligence, imagination, and in the research and learning that inform 
them, and these matters are relevant to the capacity of these 
communications to contribute to legislative outcomes. Without 
attending to these matters, one cannot say whether more citizen 
access to public media and public forums will add or detract from 
the stock of useful contributions to the dialogue about public 
issues. 
It is true that I have here diverged from the procedural test 
for public policy decisions that Sunstein announces-agreement 
among equal citizens. As indicated, he cannot be serious about 
that test, but if that really were the touchstone of legitimacy, it 
would be unthinkable that the persuasiveness and hence the sub-
stance of what is said would be irrelevant in achieving that agree-
ment. It is Sunstein, after all, who tells us that his ideal is a 
"republic of reason." (10) And as long as substance matters in 
the deliberative process, it will not do simply to assume that a 
proliferation of even amplified talk about public policy will im-
prove the decisions that are made in its name. 
Without any persuasive answer to whether the moves Sun-
stein suggests would contribute to the effective discussion of pub-
lic issues, I recur to the argument of Section I, above. While our 
First Amendment jurisprudence is far from a coherent whole, it 
has largely resisted the kind of encroachments on the preroga-
tives of (at least) print media that Sunstein's approach would en-
courage. My own sense is that deliberations about public policy 
suffer from lots of problems, but a dearth of imaginative and con-
structive suggestions for change is not one of them. Until the 
status quo in media rights is shown more clearly to be "broke," I 
wouldn't try to fix it, and certainly not in the name of delibera-
tive democracy. 
III 
The recent interest in republicanism undoubtedly comes in 
reaction to law and economics and to the extension of its homo 
economicus to the realm of politics in what is called "social 
choice theory." The "rational" actor of economic and of social 
choice theory is guided by self-interest. Much of the attempt to 
tease implications for constitutionalism from social choice theory 
proceeds from a vision of the citizen that stresses the role of self-
interested behavior. Such behavior takes political form through 
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the deployment of what James Madison called "factions" and we 
today call "pressure groups" or "interest groups" or, most omi-
nously, "special interests." In a perhaps extreme but not uncom-
mon form, social choice theorists employ a model of government 
that includes no public-regarding motivation at all. It is this ver-
sion with which Sunstein sets out to do battle. He insists that 
such single-minded self-interest in the political realm is inaccu-
rate on a descriptive level and impermissible as a normative 
matter. 
Containing the mischief of faction was, of course, a central 
concern of Madison. His Tenth Federalist is devoted to the ad-
vantages that a "well-constructed union" would have because of 
its "tendency to break and control the violence of faction."32 
There is obviously a major embarrassment for republican consti-
tutionalism here, since the civic republican antifederalists lost, 
and it is a Madisonian Constitution that contemporary republi-
cans like Sunstein are attempting to steer. Sunstein relieves the 
embarrassment by finding civic republican themes in the writings 
of Madison, Hamilton, and other federalists. That Madison and 
other federalists shared some views with antifederalists cannot be 
doubted. Whatever may be said of modern social choice theo-
rists, for example, Madison clearly thought that public-regarding 
behavior was possible by those in authority, and that deliberation 
among the public-spirited was a good thing. 
But Sunstein considerably overstates his case when he finds 
the encouragement of public spirited deliberation at the heart of 
the Madisonian system. Here is what Sunstein says: 
The basic institutions of the ... Constitution were intended to 
encourage and to profit from deliberation .... The system of 
checks and balances-the cornerstone of the system-was 
designed to encourage discussion among different governmen-
tal entities. So too with the requirement of bicameralism, 
which would bring different perspectives to bear on lawmak-
ing. The same goals accounted for the notion that laws should 
be presented to the President for his signature or veto; this 
mechanism would provide an additional perspective. The fed-
eral system would ensure a supplemental form of dialogue 
Judicial review was intended to create a further check. Its 
basic purpose was to protect the considered judgments of the 
people, as represented in the extraordinary law of the Consti-
tution, against the ill-considered or short-term considerations 
32. Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
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introduced by the people's mere agents in the course of enact-
ing ordinary law. (23) 
419 
The typical account of all the Madisonian mechanisms that 
Sunstein mentions is that they were adopted as hurdles to get in 
the way of faction-inspired legislation, not as mechanisms for de-
liberation.33 It is well known that Madison advocated a large re-
public as a means of proliferating factions, the better to combat 
factional power. With more and individually less powerful fac-
tions, and multiple units of government through which they 
might operate, Madison thought factions would check one an-
other, and thus accomplish less mischief. Thus the very mecha-
nisms of governance that Sunstein depicts as designed to 
facilitate deliberation, Madison advocated instead as obstacles to 
decision. It is true that Madison thought that legislation in the 
public interest would emerge from the process, but the focus of 
his concern was to filter out undesirable, not to promote desira-
ble, legislation. The reasons for this are fairly clear. When "a 
small number of citizens ... assemble and administer the govern-
ment in person," Madison warned, "there is nothing to check the 
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious indi-
vidual." And even in representative assemblies: 
It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to ad-
just these clashing interests and render them all subservient to 
the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at 
the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be 
made at all without taking into view indirect and remote con-
siderations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate inter-
33. Sunstein disavows the intention "to provide anything like an exhaustive histori-
cal account." (18). Rather he is in search of "a usable past." (18). The problem is that 
Madison's vision for government is so different from Sunstein's that the historical evi-
dence for a past Sunstein can use is hard to come by. Thus he quotes Hamilton (twice) as 
saying in Federalist 70 that " 'differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [the 
legislative] department ... often promote deliberation ... .' " (24, 253) Hamilton does 
say that, but the subject of Federalist 70 is the executive. Hamilton makes an extended 
and impassioned case for a single rather than a plural executive, on the ground that only a 
single executive can bring the necessary energy for the effective execution of the law. 
That obviously suggested the question of how the plural legislature could be effective. To 
that question, Hamilton gave a complex answer, including that "in the legislature, promp-
titude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit." He acknowledged that the plurality of 
the legislature "may sometimes obstruct salutary plans," and he praised it as serving "to 
check excesses in the majority." Sandwiched among these points is that it might also 
"promote deliberation and circumspection.'' "Deliberation" here might well have been 
meant to be synonymous with "circumspection," meaning something like "caution.'' But 
even if it was meant in Sunstein's apparent sense-something like "reasoned discus-
sion"-in context the mention of deliberation, by Hamilton, not Madison, seems pretty 
insignificant. 
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est which one party will find in disregarding the rights of 
another or the good of the whole.34 
Madison and Sunstein also differ in the mechanisms by 
which they believe that public-regarding legislation may win out 
over factional legislation. Madison mentions two mechanisms, 
the larger constituencies from which legislators will be chosen in 
the larger republic, making it more likely that "enlightened 
statesmen" will be found; and the "limitation of the term of ap-
pointments,"Js by which he seems to have meant the necessity 
for periodic approval by the voters. For Sunstein, on the other 
hand, the answer seems to lie basically in the application of rea-
son once democratic deliberation takes place. 
Sunstein acknowledges that the republican vision of par-
ticipatory democracy is romantic, in part because self-interested 
politics is a pervasive part of the process. (21, 27-28) He asserts, 
and I am inclined to grant that he is right, that there is also an 
important public-regarding element in most political decisions.36 
(27-28) He is surely also right when he says that "sometimes 
people motivated to vote for certain legislation cannot easily dis-
entangle the private and public factors that underlie the deci-
sion." (28) Having acknowledged this, however, he proceeds as 
if the glass is half full, but not simultaneously half empty. 
The dilemma here is that Madison's and Sunstein's visions 
for government are not congruent or even compatible, as Sun-
stein suggests, but opposed. Sunstein wants to facilitate delibera-
tion and ultimately "public interest" decisionmaking, while 
Madison wanted to impede the process and produce less selfish 
legislating. The only one who suggests a mechanism by which we 
might have the one without the other is Sunstein, and that mech-
anism is "reason." But there is no warrant for thinking that 
Madison, whose exclusive focus was structural, would have been 
consoled by this appeal to man's better self. It was just such se-
duction that Madison erected his system to circumvent. 
Still, it is not clear that the Madisonian system has accom-
plished its aims. No serious observer of contemporary American 
politics doubts that interest-group politics is thriving. I have no 
way to measure its extent or to know how much of it Madison 
would have found tolerable. I don't suppose that Madison 
34. ld. 
35. Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
36. See Arthur Maass, Congress and the Common Good 5, 18-19, 64-74 (Basic 
Books, 1983); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword 74 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1988) (Symposium on the 
Theory of Public Choice). 
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imagined that the structural devices he advanced would banish 
factional politics from the land. But it is not implausible to sup-
pose that Madison would find the present level excessive. Nor is 
it hard to come up with an explanation of what went wrong-and 
it's not status quo neutrality, or insufficient public access to the 
mass media. What Madison could hardly have foreseen was the 
growth of the United States economy, with implications for how 
powerful the lure of interest-group politics would come to be-
so powerful that it could surmount the obstacles put in its way. 
And if this is viewed as the problem, it would be compounded by 
Sunstein's treatment of status quo neutrality. For if existing 
property arrangements are no more insulated from majoritarian 
decisionmaking than a requirement that Sunsteinian reasons be 
given for invasion, then the society's resources would be even 
more readily accessible as interest -group spoils. 
Now it would be perverse to depict the growth in the econ-
omy over the past two hundred years as something that has gone 
"wrong." A flourishing interest-group politics may simply be a 
price we pay for the combination we enjoy of prosperity and de-
mocracy. But if we set our sights on Madison's target, we will be 
led at least to consider a very different set of reforms than those 
Sunstein advances. To a great extent a contemporary Madis-
onian agenda would consist of items that have found their way 
into public discourse and politics. This is testament to the endur-
ing appeal of Madison's diagnosis and to his structural approach 
to treatment. 
For instance, a balanced budget amendment to the Constitu-
tion might rein in the appetites of interest groups. The require-
ment of a balanced budget would mean that expensive interest-
group projects would naturally be opposed by the taxpaying pub-
lic and indeed by other interest groups either seeking to avoid 
paying the costs or competing for the scarce resources. Similarly, 
term limitations for Congressmen and Senators might be an item 
on a neo-Madisonian agenda. There is an argument that term 
limitations would strengthen the hands of congressional staff 
members, and that interest groups could then work even more 
effectively through them. It is possible, however, that the class of 
professional politicians that the lack of term limits has allowed to 
proliferate and flourish tends to dampen the public-interest dia-
logue both at election time and in the legislative process. 
Still another idea that might dampen interest-group politics 
is an executive line-item veto. This would, of course, strengthen 
the hand of the executive vis-a-vis the Congress, but that might 
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be a sensible move if one thought that the executive was less sus-
ceptible to interest-group pressures than the Congress. It has 
also been suggested that spiraling federal budget deficits may be 
caused by a proliferation of congressional committees with 
spending power, and the absence of any central body to bring 
discipline to the process.37 A neo-Madisonian might try to bring 
structural change to the workings of the Congress as a way to 
address this part of the problem.Js And finally, concern with in-
terest group politics could lead to a call for reinvigorated judicial 
review rather than the withdrawal that Sunstein (at least some-
times) urges.39 The judiciary is, after all, the branch most insu-
lated from politics and hence from interest group pressures. 
None of these suggestions comes without its costs. There is, 
for instance, respectable-perhaps even overwhelming-eco-
nomic opinion that a balanced budget amendment would be a 
bad idea.40 And there are powerful arguments-many of which 
Sunstein presents-that judicial review can stifle political 
processes and thus defer or scuttle solutions to problems with a 
greater chance to endure.4t (145) But these measures do not for 
37. John Cogan, What Really Causes Those Budget Deficits, Fortune, Oct. 18, 1993, 
at 116. 
38. An intriguing way to facilitate public interest deliberations by legislators is sug-
gested in John W. Ellwood and Eric M. Patashnik, In Praise of Pork, 110 Public Interest 
19 (1993). One of the dilemmas of the "public-interest legislator" is that reelection is 
facilitated by responsiveness to interest groups. Even if it is assumed that much legisla-
tion can serve both public and private purposes simultaneously (as indeed is necessary if 
there is such a thing as public-interest legislation), the public-interest legislator may well 
have an incentive to vote for interest-group legislation that at least in the aggregate will 
be more costly than his sense of the public interest would tolerate in the absence of inter-
est-group pressure. Ellwood and Patashnik argue for what might be called an "optimal" 
rather than a minimal (or zero) level of interest-group legislation that takes the form of 
costly benefits, or "pork." And, while they don't quite put it this way, the optimal level 
seems to be that amount necessary to sustain legislators politically, so that they can feel 
secure in advancing public-interest legislation. One particular suggestion they make is 
that legislation that builds constituent favors in automatically, like the indexing of social 
security benefits in 1972, is unfortunate, since it deprives legislators of repeated occasions 
to curry constituent goodwill at no greater overall cost. 
This thesis strikes me, as it does the authors, as Madisonian, id. at 21, but it also 
suggests that the distinction between structural and nonstructural reform will not always 
be so clear. If legislators were to follow Ellwood and Patashnik's suggestion, they would 
have repeated occasions to do so, or not. The "reform" if adopted by means short of a 
constitutional amendment would become structural more by education and habit than by 
virtue of anything that could be "built" into the legislative processes. 
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. 
Rev. 29, 43 n.62 (1985). 
40. See Susan Cornwell, Economists Disagree on Balanced Budget Amendment, 
Reuters, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters file. 
41. While I was writing this review Chicagoans were witness to an apparent example 
of this phenomenon, as political resolution of the latest financing controversy surrounding 
the Chicago public schools was deferred until the possibility of court resolution had 
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the most part even enter into Sunstein's discussion, because, in 
seeking to bring his own theories under Madison's attractive tent, 
he has ignored what Madison taught life was really like under 
there. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the strengths of The Partial Constitution is that it evi-
dences sophistication about so much that is its undoing. Sunstein 
is intellectually very broadly gauged, and that makes many of his 
specific discussions engaging and informative. But the whole 
does not fit together, and that makes the book a disappointment. 
There seem to be two reinforcing causes for the failure. 
First is that Sunstein advances a procedural remedy (deliberative 
democracy) when his ultimate concerns often seem to be deeply 
substantive. Ironically, this could be depicted as reaching out for 
a false neutrality, which is, of course, Sunstein's suggestion of 
where the rest of us have gone wrong. The second is his 
penchant for systematization. There is an initial allure to both of 
the central notions he deploys-deliberative democracy and sta-
tus quo neutrality-because they seem at first blush to help cap-
ture and to order so many troubling pieces of the contemporary 
constitutional scene. As Sunstein deploys them, however, they 
dissolve into little more than slogans. 
Theories do not, of course, have to capture all of reality to 
be useful or "valid." Sunstein's failing is in pretending that he 
has presented a full description of a problem and a coherent ap-
proach to its solution. He has done neither, though he has 
presented a good measure of interesting constitutional commen-
tary along the way. 
passed. See Editorial, So Close, So Far Apan on Schools, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4, 1993, 
at A30. 
